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BOOK REVIEW
A Tale of Seven Scientists and a New Philosophy of Science, 
Eric Scerri, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, 228 pp, 
ISBN 978-0-19-023299-3, $24.
The author, Eric Scerri, will be well known to 
chemists and historians of chemistry, not least for his 
successful The Periodic Table published in 2007. In a 
number of important publications Scerri has explored 
the chemical sciences in a philosophical and historical 
context and played a crucial role in the establishment 
of philosophy of chemistry as an academic discipline 
on par with philosophy of physics. Following his semi-
popular A Tale of Seven Elements from 2013, in his 
new book he examines seven lesser known scientists 
whose work and place in history he uses illustratively to 
develop what he ambitiously calls a new philosophy of 
science. The book starts somewhat pompously with two 
forewords and a lengthy autobiographical section, after 
which follow descriptions of the seven scientists, namely 
John Nicholson, Anton Van den Broek, Richard Abegg, 
Charles Bury, John D. Main Smith, Edmund Stoner, and 
Charles Janet. The last part of the book is devoted to a 
more general exposition of an evolutionary philosophy 
of science advocated by Scerri.
One motivation for Scerri’s project is, somewhat 
strangely, his dissatisfaction with standard histories of 
quantum mechanics which he suggests overrate the con-
tributions of German-speaking physicists and underrate 
those belonging to the English-speaking world. He does 
not elaborate though, and perhaps wisely so. Whether 
one likes it or not, with the exception of Paul Dirac the 
emergence of modern quantum mechanics was almost 
entirely due to physicists from Germany and Austria.
The portraits of the seven scientists—some of them 
physicists, others chemists and even amateurs—are in-
teresting and informative. What they have in common, 
according to Scerri, is that they are minor players, practi-
cally unknown and who therefore have been written out 
of history. Moreover, they all contributed in some way 
or other to atomic chemistry and physics in the period 
ca. 1910-1930, in particular to the understanding of the 
arrangement of electrons in atoms. The reason why Scerri 
focuses on these marginal figures is that they illustrate 
one of his main theses, that the contributions of the lesser, 
even obscure figures are no less important to the overall 
progress of science than those of the famous scientists. 
This thesis he takes quite seriously, even denying that 
there are any “outstanding personalities” in science. 
According to this view there is no reason to celebrate 
scientists such as Newton, Lavoisier, Maxwell, Darwin 
and Einstein, for they all belong to the same crowd as the 
thousands of scientists who have not achieved historical 
recognition. 
The little known British astrophysicist John Nich-
olson was just as important in early atomic theory as 
Niels Bohr, and Edmund Stoner no less important than 
Wolfgang Pauli in explaining the periodic system in 
terms of quantum theory. In fact, “everybody, including 
the lesser figures involved in any scientific development, 
plays a fundamentally equal role” (p 9, my emphasis). 
This is a general claim as surprising as it is unconvincing. 
Scerri maintains the claim by arguing that the work of the 
seven minor scientists stimulated or catalyzed the much 
better known discoveries of Bohr and his likes. But he 
does not always document the claimed catalytic effect 
and in some of his case studies there is no demonstrable 
effect. This is clear from the chapter on the obscure 
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Frenchman Charles Janet, “who did not produce a piece 
of work that catalyzed the discoveries of others” (p 149). 
So why include him? 
Other problems with Scerri’s historiography of 
science are his repeated claims that the seven portrayed 
scientists are undeservedly unknown and neglected in 
standard histories. The German chemist Richard Abegg 
is certainly well known in the history of chemistry and 
even the Dutch amateur scientist Antonius Van den Broek 
is not quite as unknown as Scerri suggests. He and his 
important introduction of the atomic number are routinely 
mentioned in the scholarly literature and there are a few 
specialist papers on him. But Scerri does not cite these 
secondary sources. As regards Charles Bury, Scerri 
notes correctly that he is not included in the authorita-
tive Dictionary of Scientific Biography (1970-1976), but 
he conveniently overlooks or is unaware of the detailed 
biography appearing in the supplement volume of 1990. 
Scerri is of course correct that most minor players are left 
out in historical accounts of a more general and popular 
kind but fails to distinguish properly between this kind of 
history and the academic or scholarly history. Moreover, 
there are after all good reasons why these minor players 
are considered minor and given little attention. 
The historical part of Scerri’s book, making up more 
than half of it, is in places deficient and does not always 
live up to generally accepted standards of history of 
science. On several occasions he cites sources without 
adding a reference or he fails to refer to the relevant sec-
ondary literature. On other occasions he misrepresents 
quotations or gives the reader a wrong impression of what 
they are about (for two examples, both relating to Bohr, 
see p 34 and p 84). The book also contains several errors 
and questionable statements. Commenting on an article in 
Chemical News of 1929 dealing with Janet’s work, Scerri 
wonders if the article, to which he gives no proper refer-
ence, were written by “the  editor of the journal, William 
Crookes, who had a deep interest in the periodic table” 
(p 165). Crookes was indeed the founding editor of the 
journal, but he died in 1919. To mention but one more 
error, Scerri states that Louis de Broglie and Alexandre 
Dauvillier did not propose electron configurations based 
on X-ray spectroscopy that differed from Bohr’s. The two 
French scientists did in fact propose such configurations. 
The major aim of Scerri’s book is not so much to 
contribute to the history of chemistry and physics as it is, 
much more ambitiously, to suggest a new philosophy of 
science in agreement with and to some extent based on 
the historical record. He places his work “in the grand 
tradition of attempting to explain what science really 
is” (p xx). So what is science, really? Scerri advocates 
a thoroughly evolutionary view of science which he de-
scribes as holistic and organic, the minor figures being 
the missing links in the seamless evolutionary chain that 
gradually and cumulatively leads to epistemic progress. 
Contrary to Thomas Kuhn, but in agreement with many 
later philosophers and historians, he rejects discontinui-
ties and revolutions in the development of science and 
instead speaks of “the scientific enterprise … as a unified 
and single organic ‘entity’ with a life of its own” (p xxv). 
The claim that science evolves organically, unconsciously 
and almost spontaneously does not, in my view, amount 
to an explanation of scientific progress and does not ex-
plain why science developed more dramatically in some 
periods than in others. Chemistry experienced a drastic 
change in the era of Lavoisier, if not perhaps a revolution 
in the strong sense used by Kuhn, but there is no need 
to distinguish sharply between evolution and revolution 
or to identify the latter with abrupt changes à la Kuhn. 
Scientific change may be and often is both evolutionary 
and revolutionary.
With Scerri’s emphasis on science as a collective en-
terprise evolving as “one social entity” one might expect 
that he would be sympathetic to sociological approaches, 
but this is not the case. He deliberately disregards social 
factors and institutional structures in his description of the 
seven scientists and dissociates his own “literally social 
approach” from the approach followed by sociologically 
oriented philosophers and historians of science. Scerri 
wants to pay more attention to the numerous “worker-
bee-like scientists” who contribute to the progress of 
science, but he has nothing to say about the even more 
numerous technicians, laboratory assistants, administra-
tors and students whose work is no less important in the 
world of modern science.
While mostly criticizing Kuhn’s views as expounded 
in his Structure of 1962, Scerri agrees with Kuhn that 
science does not develop toward fixed and external truths. 
“Scientific knowledge is never right or wrong, because it 
is not proceeding toward an external truth” (p 196). This 
is a belief for which, as far as I know, there is no solid 
justification. Even if we admit that scientific knowledge is 
largely driven from within it does not preclude that some 
views about nature are right and others wrong. Surely, 
the view that water is a composite body belongs to the 
first category while the belief that water is elemental 
belongs to the second. 
Scerri’s belief that it is pointless to speak of right or 
wrong scientific views is complemented by his belief that 
what matters in science is only progress as a whole. But 
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how can one speak about progress and at the same time 
deny the distinction between right and wrong theories 
or at least between more or less correct theories?  Scerri 
seems to be aware of the problem but tries to avoid it 
by referring to the close analogy between the develop-
ment of science and evolutionary biology. The theories 
that lead to most progress, he says, are those that have 
superior empirical support and provide the most satisfac-
tory explanation of facts. But isn’t this just another way 
of saying that these theories are more right? It follows 
from what Scerri calls the essentially organic nature of 
scientific progress that issues of priority and the credit 
apportioned to individual scientists are of no importance. 
And yet Scerri, in his historical portraits of the seven 
minor scientists, is preoccupied with just that, to bring 
them back onto the stage of history of science and to 
credit them for insights that traditionally, but unjustly, 
are ascribed to the heroic figures of science. It is obvi-
ously important for Scerri to credit Van den Broek with 
the discovery of the atomic number and to secure his 
priority over physicists like Bohr and Moseley.
Perhaps the most serious problem in Scerri’s book 
lies in the relationship between history and philosophy 
of science. His philosophy is historically oriented and 
inspired, but the historical evidence behind it is curiously 
scant given that his philosophical claims are of a broad 
and completely general nature. What he is suggesting 
is not a philosophical perspective on chemical atomic 
theory in the early part of the twentieth century but a 
new philosophy of what science really is and how it 
progresses. Now science is a many-faced phenomenon, 
consisting of many separate disciplines and with a his-
tory that stretches back at least to the renaissance and in 
some areas to ancient Greece. When Scerri is speaking 
about science in general, what has he in mind and which 
periods is he referring to? Probably not astronomy in 
the Copernican era or neuroscience in the twenty-first 
century, and yet these two areas belong as much to sci-
ence as the problem of atomic electron configurations at 
the time of Bohr. As a philosopher Scerri is concerned 
with “science as a whole,” but it is doubtful whether the 
phrase is more than just an abstract label. Nowhere does 
he comment on the question but seems to presuppose that 
all sciences in all periods can be understood in the same 
terms as his chosen case-studies. 
Although Scerri does not derive his philosophy from 
the cases of Nicholson and the six other unappreciated 
scientists it is to some extent generalized or extrapolated 
from these case studies, which is obviously problematic. 
After all, it is a very small and arbitrary selection with 
respect to chronology and research area. Had other cases 
based on different scientific fields and historical periods 
been chosen, the philosophical lessons would presumably 
have been different. Although Scerri is strongly opposed 
to physical reductionism, one may object that his philoso-
phy of science implicitly rests on the reductionist view 
that all of science evolves in the same way as chemistry 
and physics and is basically of the same nature as these 
two sciences.
To summarize, A Tale of Seven Scientists is a well-
written, provocative and stimulating book, a bold attempt 
to base an evolutionary view of science on fragments of 
the modern history of chemistry and physics. But there 
are serious flaws in it, both as regards the historical sec-
tions and, not least, the way these sections are used to 
justify Scerri’s general ideas of a philosophy of science. 
This book needs to be read with critical eyes.
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